Date Sunday, May 3, 2009 at 11:40PM
By General Barry R. McCaffrey, U.S. Army (Retired)
Written Statement of: General Barry R. McCaffrey, U.S. Army (Retired)
ENGAGING CUBA FOR RE-INTEGRATION INTO THE COMMUNITY OF THE AMERICAS
Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, United States Military
Academy, West Point, NY
Submitted to House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Hearing on
"National Security Implications of U.S. Policy toward Cuba"
April 29, 2009 - ENGAGING CUBA FOR RE-INTEGRATION INTO THE COMMUNITY OF
THE AMERICAS
1. RECOGNITION:
• John Tierny, Chairman
• Jeff Flake, Ranking Member
2. GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF STATEMENT:
• There are three dimensions for Cuban political transition – which will
happen: economic, political, human.
3. POLITICAL DIMENSION:
• Castro regime has lost legitimacy domestically and internationally.
• It is barely surviving and could quickly collapse if the economic
lifeline thrown by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is withdrawn.
• Authoritarian regime has entrenched itself and controlled instruments
(military, economy, courts, law enforcement) of power for 50 years.
• Civil society (academia, church, civic organizations, media, private
sector) has been atomized and will have to learn how to participate in
pluralistic democratic settings.
• Political transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes have
occurred frequently in Latin America. We know that democracy can
successfully be consolidated following decades of dictatorship.
• Challenges in Cuba are enormous. Transitions in Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile occurred after a 20-year interregnum. In none of these countries
did authoritarian regimes have such a complete hold on power. In just
about every country, there was a cadre of political leadership that had
prior experience in democratic governance. Cubans will almost have to
start from scratch in building the political institutions that are
essential to good governance and participative policy making.
Cubans will have to define their own political systems and determine the
pace of transition.
Outsiders can be supportive. Includes the U.S., Latin American nations,
European Union, non-governmental organizations, and multilateral
organizations. But Cubans must own and be in charge of the process of
determining their future political system and rules of engagement.
4. ECONOMIC DIMENSION:
• The Cuban state has been unable to meet the aspirations of the Cuban
people.
• GDP in Cuba is a fraction of what it needs to be in order to meet
basic requirements of its people.
• Cabbies, bellboys, and prostitutes routinely make more than doctors
and other professionals.
• If Cuban government cannot establish a trajectory of rapid economic
growth, Cubans will leave the island in droves (Ted Gurr's political
science theory of perceived relative deprivation).
• Cuban GDP/capita will have to reach a level similar to that of Puerto
Rico (which depends on USG federal aid (social security, Medicare,
Medicaid, food stamps, transfer payments, federal positions, federal
retirements, etc.) in order to have immigration equilibrium. PR
GDP/capita is approximately 80% of U.S. GDP.
• Economic activity in Cuba will have to be approx. $200B/year in order
to reach equilibrium status quo. Present GDP is approximately 25% of
what it needs to be.
• Tremendous infrastructure implications:
o Cuba's infrastructure (water, power, rail, transit, ports, airports,
highways, residential and non-residential real estate) is inadequate to
the island's present and future requirements.
o It will require massive infusions of capital, planning, and program
management and construction know-how.
2. Statement by General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.)
o Could be $5-10B/year for 5-10 years.
o International donor community will not provide significant funds.
o Private sector will be unwilling to invest absent high confidence on a
secure return on investment.
o By default, will likely have to be USG that provides lion's share of
investment (if we don't we could see a million Cubans headed to Florida).
• Big economic opportunities for U.S. firms. Marshall Plan like economic
assistance program could create new, large, sustainable markets for U.S.
goods (e.g. construction equipment, trucks, cars, buses, aircraft,
durable goods, generators, etc.). If we don't fill this space, someone
else will.
• Other nations are well positioned to help with infrastructure and
construction programs: Spanish firms and others who have been investing
in tourism sector
5. HUMAN DIMENSION:
• There were 35,000 people of Cuban descent in the U.S. prior to the
1959 revolution.
• Today there are 1.2M, constituting the 3d-largest group of
Hispanic-Americans after Mexicans and Puerto Ricans. Ratio of Cubans in
Cuba to Cubans in the USA is approx 10:1.
• Number of people of Puerto Rican heritage in the USA is approximately
4M — about same number as the population of the island (4M).
• 125,000 Cubans came to the U.S. during the Mariel boatlift of 1980,
causing severe strain in South Florida and requiring temporary refugee
facilities in locations as far away as Fort Chaffee, Arkansas and Fort
McCoy, Wisconsin.
• A transition could result in a massive wave of migrants which could
overwhelm federal at-sea interdiction capabilities and receiving
communities in Florida.
• Our government needs to be realistic in its assessments of the
potential humanitarian effects of regime change and what our response
will be.
• We can't have Katrina-like unpreparedness.
• Best case outcome for U.S. is if Cubans decide that there is a viable
economic future for them on the island and remain there to build the
requisite political, social, and economic institutions that will result
in a prosperous economy and standard of living – a situation similar to
contemporary Puerto Rico.
• Worst case scenario is that political system in Cuba fails to deliver
and Cubans leave in droves (as Haitians do & residents of the Dominican
Republic do).
6. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:
• Potential for corruption – as authoritarian government cedes control
new space will be created and could be exploited (example - Post USSR
Russian mafias).
• Drug Trafficking. Caribbean used to be the vector for about 50% of
cocaine from Colombia. Now 90% goes through Mexico. We'll have to work
with Cuban government and security forces to prevent drug traffickers
from seeking to establish a foot hold in Cuba.
• Cuban Armed Forces. Generally professional. Role, mission,
organization, and size will likely change to reflect new Cuban reality.
Mil-to-Mil relations between U.S. and Cuba military can play a positive
role. Example of SOUTHCOM engagement with Latin militaries
(humanitarian, disaster relief, human rights).
• Unresolved issues from 50 years ago:
o Abuses of present regime – plenty of examples in Latin America for how
to deal with past abuses (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru). Past
can't be swept under the rug. Reconciliation and justice, where
appropriate and feasible, are essential.
Statement by General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.) 3
o Property expropriations – plenty of examples in formerly communist
eastern Europe on how to resolve old property disputes. All sides have
to be dispassionate and realistic. Could require 3d-party resolution.
• Strengths of Cuban society:
o One people. While ethnically diverse they are proud of their culture
and history. Schisms such as we see in Iraq are not present.
o Education. Well educated. Good human building blocks.
o Industrious. The example of Cuban-American entrepreneurial effort.
Business sector will likely quickly self-organize and be essential to
economic vitality.
o Health Care System. Better than just about any other Latin American
nation.
o Familial links to Cuban-Americans in the U.S. – these will be
enormously beneficial to economic, social, and political growth.
7. CONCLUSION:
• The people of Cuba need to determine their own future.
• U.S. Government role will be important and must be supportive. We
should start now by rapidly lifting the embargo. This will be a catalyst
for political change.
• Our technical experts can be helpful but they must work in partnership
with capable Cubans and play a supportive role.
• Cuba will reassume its place in the international community. We must
recognize that it will have political, economic, and social
relationships with multiple nations.
• In the end, a broadly cooperative approach will be healthier for Cuba
and for longer-term U.S.-Cuban relations.
• Multilateral lending organizations like the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank will make
enormous contributions.
• Government-to-government relations and accords will likely not be the
centerpiece of future U.S. – Cuba dialogue. We must make space for civil
society right from the start as we reengage with Cuba.
American Daily Review - articles blog - The Possible Re-Integration
of Cuba (4 May 2009)
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