Guevara had important posts in Castro's government. He made a trip to
several countries early in 1965. "In Algiers on February 24, 1965, he
made what turned out to be his last public appearance on the
international stage when he delivered a speech at an economic seminar on
Afro-Asian solidarity.
He specified the moral duty of the socialist countries, accusing them of
tacit complicity with the exploiting Western countries. He proceeded to
outline a number of measures which he said the communist-bloc countries
must implement in order to accomplish the defeat of imperialism. Having
criticized the Soviet Union (the primary financial backer of Cuba) in
such a public manner, he returned to Cuba on March 14 to a solemn
reception by Fidel and Raúl Castro, Osvaldo Dorticós and Carlos Rafael
Rodríguez at the Havana airport. Two weeks later in 1965, Guevara
dropped out of public life and then vanished altogether. . ." It was
the result of an interventionist act of the imperialistic Soviet Union
in Cuban political affairs.
When he disappeared from Cuba, all of his loyalists were taken out of
key positions in government. I knew personally Santiago Riera, very
close to Guevara; he was a Minister in Castro's government and was
reassigned to a far lesser post.
My niece was a friend of the wife of the principal pilot at the service
of Ernesto Che Guevara. She commented with me around that time that her
friend's husband had been in a trip to Africa. He had brought some
clothing for their baby daughter. My niece remarked that the labels were
in French. It was obvious to me that Guevara had gone to a French
speaking country in Africa to spearhead some insurgency. Next day I went
to work at the French News Agency. I told this story to the Bureau's
Chief, Ives Daude. He dismissed it saying, a white man can not go
undetected in a black African country.
The historical information is that Che Guevara went to the Republic of
the Congo, previously known as Republic of Zaire, a former Belgium
colony. ". . . Guevara led the Cuban operation in support of the Marxist
Simba movement, which had emerged from the ongoing Congo Crisis.
Guevara, his second-in-command Victor Dreke, and twelve other Cuban
expeditionaries arrived in the Congo on April 24, 1965, with a
contingent of approximately 100 Afro-Cubans joining them soon afterward.
. ." His intervention in Congo-Kinshasa failed miserably in a short
period. It was his second defeat. Second parts were never good (segundas
partes nunca fueron buenas.) Prior to that, Guevara led a column of
Cuban soldiers in an offensive against the anti-Castro guerrillas at the
Escambray ranges in central Cuba, in the early sixties. His column was
defeated by the insurgents and Guevara had to be extricated from the
battlefield by a Cuban army helicopter.
Guevara went back to Cuba. There was no any role for him there; he was a
heavy burden to Castro, taking into account Cuba's relationship with the
Soviet Union.
Guevara contacted left wing activists in Bolivia to organize an
insurgency in the countryside. They felt that conditions were ripe in
Bolivia after General René Barrientos' coup in 1964. ". . . He
(Barrientos) was confident enough to conduct a government controlled
election in 1966, winning formal election to the presidency." Guevara's
assessment was that there was popular resentment against Barrientos,
similarly to what Batista had in Cuba after his coup in 1952.
Guevara entered Bolivia in the fall of 1966. Other Cuban military men
got also into the country. They, and a group of Bolivians, started a
guerrilla uprising. They chose a forested area in southeast Bolivia,
close to the borders of Paraguay and Argentina, his homeland. Guevara,
in his daydreams, thought that, after establishing a guerrilla base
there, he would organize columns that would march to nearby countries,
spreading the insurgency extensively.
". . . A study of the Bolivian campaign reveals a counter guerrilla
success story. Despite Che's many mistakes, both in planning and
execution, those who engineered his defeat deserve credit for exploiting
Guevara's tactical errors, thus denying him victory. The Bolivian
Rangers who captured Che and his fellow guerrillas skillfully executed
established counter guerrilla tactics with quick and decisive results. .
."
Guevara came to realize that he was dealing with a situation far
different than what the Cuban guerrillas had in their fight against
Batista's soldiers. He wrote in his diary ". . . that the peasants
refuse to help and are turning into informers. . ." It was too late for
him.
He and his diminished group were engaged by Bolivian Ranger platoons; he
was wounded and captured near the town of Las Higuera. The news spread
fast among all the Bolivian military ranks. These military had suffered
the lost of close to 50 of their men fighting a guerrilla war led by
foreigners: Guevara, an Argentinean, and a bunch of Cuban military men.
It was Guevara's third defeat. The third time always happens (a la
tercera va la vencida.) This time he lost his life at the hands of a
sergeant that was ordered to execute him. His execution was similar to
the many he had directed or personally done in Cuba. "El que a hierro
mata, a hierro muere."
". . . Abandonment best describes Castro's actions as the situation
deteriorated in Bolivia. Despite Che's implication by message on May 18,
1967, that he desired public announcement of the Bolivia insurgency,
Castro never acknowledged to the world that Che Guevara was fighting for
the "liberation" of Bolivia. He remained strangely quiet throughout the
summer, when publicizing Che's presence in Bolivia might have achieved a
propaganda victory for the beleaguered guerrillas. Castro may have
sensed the inevitable defeat of Che's guerrillas and decided to cut his
losses, allowing the aborted campaign to wither away. Another theory
behind Castro's abandonment of Che involves the underlying issue of
personal problems between the two men. Daniel James proposes that Castro
believed that publicly announcing the insurgency would greatly enhance
Che's reputation as a worldwide revolutionary. In view of the two men's
recent differences, Fidel may have considered resurrecting Che as a
great leader counter to his own personal interests. James concludes:
"Fidel Castro and the Bolivian army combined unwittingly to end a mutual
threat". . ."
Camilo Cienfuegos and Ernesto Che Guevara, after their deaths, became
propaganda icons that Castro exploited to the nth degree.
By: Gonzalo Fernández
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