Bush's secret, soft line on post-Fidel Cuba

Bush's secret, soft line on post-Fidel Cuba.
Slow Motion
by Joshua Kurlantzick
Only at TNR Online | Post date 09.07.06

As Fidel Castro battles for his life following serious intestinal
surgery, the Bush administration seems to be stepping up pressure on
Cuba, trying to promote a rapid transition to democracy after el
Presidente puffs his last cigar. In a report on Cuba presented in July
by a high-level presidential commission, appointees laid out a scenario
in which a post-Fidel Cuba would embrace multiparty elections and use
American assistance to build a free market economy. The White House has
appointed a "Cuba transition coordinator," a hard-line former
congressional aide named Caleb McCarry, and approved handing him nearly
$80 million every two years to "hasten a transition" to democracy.

Of course, calling for Cuba libre plays well in Florida, a crucial state
for any Republican presidential campaign, and some administration
officials and exiles clearly support fast democratization on the island.
(In a recent piece on Cuba in The New Yorker, Jon Lee Anderson
interviews one prominent exile who tells him that Castro "must be
brought down by armed force.") But, behind the heated rhetoric, the
administration and some of its Cuban-American allies actually may prefer
a slower, more gradual transition in Cuba. And that might be the wisest
policy of all.

On the surface, the Bush White House seems as hard-line as possible on
Cuba. In 2003, the White House tightened rules on visits to the island
by family members, researchers, and aid organizations, and it slashed
the amount of remittances Cubans in the United States could send back to
their families. That same year, the administration created the
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, which produced the post-Fidel
report and prompted the creation of McCarry's post. The commission
envisions a wave of Cuban-American exiles and American technocrats
swooping into a post-Fidel Cuba, creating new banks, rebuilding the
physical infrastructure, and teaching Cubans about electoral democracy.
Several Cuba experts believe the White House has made it a top
administration priority to ensure that Raúl Castro, Fidel's brother,
does not consolidate control when Fidel dies.

But dig deeper. The White House's key Cuban-American allies offer far
narrower visions of a post-Fidel island. Florida Senator Mel Martinez,
the most prominent Cuban-American Republican, told Anderson that he
learned from trips to postwar Iraq that a quick, forced transition won't
work. "A governmental structure must remain in place," Martinez argued.
"As in Iraq, in Cuba there are those with blood on their hands. But
that's not everyone." In another interview, this time with The
Economist, Martinez went further, arguing that Cuban-Americans should
stay calm and treat change on the island with patience, rather than
pushing for rapid regime change. "I think people need to keep their
emotions in check," Martinez argued.

Even the administration does not act as tough as it talks. In recent
weeks, the White House has actually relaxed some immigration
restrictions on Cubans, making it easier for a limited number of Cubans
to come to the United States. This is the wrong thing to do if the White
House is trying to precipitate a Cuban collapse, since allowing some
outflow will reduce pressure on Havana's government.

The broader Cuban-American community has also become less predictably
strident than in past years. The first generation of fighters who fled
the island is passing away, and many of those that remain alive have
mellowed, paying less attention to their homeland. Alberto Beguiristain,
a 72-year-old exile who once assisted the Bay of Pigs invasion, recently
told Time that he no longer dreams of getting on a speedboat when Fidel
dies and roaring back to Cuba. Elena Freyre, head of the Cuban-American
Defense League, an exile organization in Miami, agreed, telling Time
that "90 percent of [Cubans exiles] no longer desire to go back and live
there."

A moderate policy makes sense. Of course, no one wishes on Cubans a life
like they have today under Fidel, where some people struggle to eat,
civil society leaders get tossed in jail, and hard-line young adherents
of el Presidente emulate Red Guards in their fierce destruction of
Castro opponents. But rapid regime change in Cuba might not benefit
Cubans or the United States. As has occurred during other periods of
political transition in Cuba, rapid regime change could result in an
orgy of bloodletting, especially if a post-Fidel regime tried, like
American viceroy L. Paul Bremer in Iraq, to quickly purge former
supporters of Castro. Unlike in Iraq, thousands of miles from the United
States, violence in Cuba could create an exodus to Florida--exactly what
the Bush administration does not want.

Worse, in a post-Fidel Cuba where various interest groups struggle for
power, democrats could find themselves undermined by their association
with Washington, on a nationalistic island conditioned by years of
anti-American rhetoric. Referring to McCarry's $80 million fund, Cuban
democracy activist Manuel Cuesta Morúa told The Boston Globe, "Those are
80 million arguments for the Cuban government" to portray democrats as
tools of the United States. "This is putting gasoline on the fire,"
Elizardo Sanchez, another activist, told the Chicago Tribune.

To be sure, a gradual transition is not terrific. The admittedly brutal
Raúl or another transitional figure could increase Cuba's dependence on
China, which has cultivated close relations with Fidel's brother. (China
today is Cuba's second-largest trading partner.) But Raúl also has a
reputation for greater pragmatism, and, if he learns from China's
economic transition, he could promote gradual liberalization of the
Cuban economy. This would require greater commercial ties to the United
States, and it would give Washington time to help wean Cuba from the
hard-line group of ministers devoted to ensuring what Anderson described
as a continuation of Castro's revolution without Fidel.

Washington could use even a moderately improved relationship with Cuba,
since it is losing the entire region. The Bush administration came into
office in 2001 vowing to make Latin America a priority of the
administration, and many Latin Americans placed high hopes on the
governor from a U.S. border state. But, since September 11, Bush has
almost completely ignored the Western Hemisphere. Not surprisingly, in
polls across Latin America, Bush often enjoys a popularity rating of
less than 25 percent. With even a slightly better situation in Cuba,
those numbers might once again climb out of the basement.

Joshua Kurlantzick is a special correspondent for The New Republic.

http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w060904&s=kurlantzick090506