Cuban Agent Speaks Out

Cuban Agent Speaks Out
2006-04-25 Cuba Focus, Issue 75, April 24, 2006

The increasing radicalization and anti-Americanism in Latin America
represents a significant and challenging trend in the region. Fidel
Castro has been recognized by many of the leaders of this movement as
their mentor and/or symbol.

Since 1990, when the Foro de Sao Paolo(1) was created under Castro’s
auspices, the Cuban regime has devoted significant effort and resources
in supporting pro-Cuban and anti-American leaders in the region. Without
completely renouncing the violent road to power, Castro began, during
the 1990s and the beginning of this century, to support leaders he
approved of both at the local and national levels. He saw significant
possibilities in the democratic atmosphere prevailing in the region to
bring anti-American allies of the Cuban regime to power.

While some aspects of support, such as the huge contingent of doctors in
Venezuela, are well-known, an interview with Delfín Fernández(2), also
known as “Agente Otto,” former Cuban security official and close Castro
associate, revealed tangible details of some lesser-known tactics of
influence.

Mr. Fernández, who operated for many years under the alias of “Agente
Otto,” discussed a number of the tactics utilized by the Castro regime
to shore up political influence in Latin America. Cash contributions
were commonly used, and were not necessarily limited to ideological
allies: Fernández personally delivered briefcases full of cash totaling
US$4 million in cash to León Febres Cordero, the president of Ecuador
from 1984 to 1988 and leader of the right-wing Social Christian Party.
Another cash delivery by Fernández in the name of the Cuban government
was to support Ivan Blasser, a young, promising businessman in Panama,
who was a 2004 presidential candidate for the small National Union Party
(PUN). Much of the cash given by the Cuban government was used in the
late eighties for social programs in a campaign to make Blasser more
palatable and recognizable to lower income Panamanians.

Some of the less overt support rendered is not monetary in nature, but
are offers of personal protection. Perhaps due to Castro’s early
recognition of the possible strategic importance of a friendly
government in Caracas, Fernández reports that after the failed coup
attempt in Venezuela in 1992, Hugo Chávez was given asylum in a protocol
house in Havana. As Chávez’ political star rose, so did the Cuban
commitment to his safety. The personal security of the present president
of Venezuela is guaranteed by Cuban personnel; his bodyguards and top
security advisors have been sent from Havana to Caracas.

More recent strategic allies are receiving the same support. At the
recent inauguration of Evo Morales in Bolivia, a prominent Colonel from
Cuban security services was part of the personal security contingent of
Bolivia’s president which is staffed by Cubans.

While Castro has been supporting favorable candidates in democratic
elections, the long-held dream of exporting violent revolution has
remained throughout these years. Fernández reports that some of the most
notorious terrorist groups in the hemisphere and beyond received
technical, financial, and logistical support from the Cuban government.
Fernández confirmed that the FARC, a leftist terrorist group involved in
the longstanding civil war in Colombia, has received plane loads of arms
from the Cuban government to continue their struggle.

He also confirmed that Sub-Comandante Marcos, the masked separatist
leader in the southern state of Chiapas, Mexico, has received monetary
support from Cuba. Fernandez also explained that a facility exists in
Guanabo, in the outskirts of Havana, dedicated to the training of
terrorist groups such as the above-mentioned FARC of Colombia, the
Shining Path of Peru, ETA of Spain, the Macheteros of Puerto Rico, and
others. This covert support in Latin America expands Cuba’s influence
and is another layer to a complex strategy of leverage and political
protection.

Fernández mentioned a common practice in Cuba of surveillance and
maintenance of detailed files on foreign businessmen who visit Cuba.
Special security personnel are assigned to visiting businessmen to
supervise their activities and to attempt to influence them or, if
necessary, to compromise them to later extract statements or information
needed by the Castro regime. Similar tactics are utilized for other
important visitors to the island.

(1) The Foro de Sao Paolo is a regional conference that periodically
brings together political parties of the Latin American left to
coordinate strategies that counteract neoliberal influence and to oppose
the United States. Members include the Communist Parties of numerous
Latin American countries, the Sandinistas of Nicaragua, and the
Tupamaros, an Uruguayan armed leftist group now recognized as a legal
political party.

(2) The interview was conducted at the Institute for Cuban and
Cuban-American Studies (ICCAS) at the University of Miami on January 24,
2006. Participating in the interview were Brian Latell, Senior Research
Associate and Eric Driggs, Research Associate at ICCAS. Fernández was a
member of Fidel Castro’s personal security contingent and conducted the
personal business of the Castro brothers. He defected in Spain in 1998
and currently resides in Miami. The information provided are the
statements of Mr. Fernández and do not necessarily represent the point
of view of ICCAS or the Cuba Transition Project (CTP).

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