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Sunday, October 07, 2007

Cuban espionage regaining pre-Iraq war strength

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Cuban espionage regaining pre-Iraq war strength
Posted on Thu, Oct. 04, 2007
By CHRIS SIMMONS
Cuban_Intelligence@yahoo.com

In May 2003, the United States expelled 14 Cuban diplomats for
espionage. That action was the largest expulsion of Cuban intelligence
officers and the third-largest expulsion in U.S. history. Although the
expulsions occurred less than eight weeks after the Iraq war started,
Washington did not acknowledge that the expulsions retaliated for Cuba's
intelligence trafficking with Baghdad during the buildup for the Iraq
invasion.

Seven of the spy-diplomats were assigned to the Cuban Mission to the
United Nations (CMUN) in New York City, while the remainder served at
Havana's Interests Section in Washington.

Previous expulsions of Cuban diplomats had been limited, consisting of
only one to four intelligence officers. The FBI stated that the Bush
administration and the State Department led the expulsion, rather than
as a direct result of U.S. counterintelligence activities. Intended to
send a strong message to Havana, President Bush may have personally
approved the expulsion.

Not previously known was that the FBI and Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) counterintelligence participated in the State-led interagency
effort. The State Department's unprecedented inclusion of DIA resulted
from the exceptionally close relations between the organization's
Cuba-watchers, the strong case DIA made detailing Cuban targeting of
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and its insistence that Havana pay a price
for risking the lives of U.S. military personnel. At the time, DIA had
the Pentagon's premier counterintelligence researchers on Cuba, and
these experts led a large interagency effort against the Cuban
intelligence services. Regrettably, the program withered when the agency
lost its key talent.

Media reports of the time mistakenly speculated that the expulsions were
a result of the growing tensions between Havana and Washington. Eight
months after the war began, a senior Pentagon official told The
Washington Times that Cuba shared intelligence on the United States with
Iraq. More specifically, Havana provided Iraqi intelligence with
information on U.S. troop movements and associated military activities.
Gertz speculated that the Iraq-Cuba intelligence ties were a result of
Cuba's secret oil purchases from the Hussein regime. Iraq reportedly
began providing Havana with oil in the late 1990s.

Cuba's high-risk adventurism occurred on the heels of detailed
revelations of Ana Montes' espionage, including her efforts in the late
1980s to kill U.S. and Salvadoran soldiers during the war against the
FMLN, the Salvador guerrilla movement. Cuba arrogantly assumed it could
again put the lives of U.S. military personnel at risk without any
consequences. This strategic blunder made a major U.S. response a fait
accompli.

The expulsions crippled Cuban intelligence operations in the United
States. At the time, 37 Cuban diplomats were assigned to the CMUN and 26
to the Interests Section in Washington. Officials on temporary tours
often augment the permanent staff.

It is generally accepted that at least 50 percent of CMUN diplomats are
intelligence officers, which helps explain why the CMUN is the hub for
Cuban intelligence operations in the United States. Historically, the
Interests Section conducted influence operations and spotted and
assessed potential agents. It was not until 1981 that Washington
expelled an Interests Section officer for espionage. As such, its
intelligence footprint is lower, probably around one-third of the
section's overall staff.

Thus, the loss of 14 of an estimated 31 Cuban diplomatic spies inflicted
a devastating 45 percent loss in staffing. The surprise of the
unprecedented action amplified the impact, because it prevented Cuba's
case officers from carefully transferring their agent networks over to
new spy handlers. Analysis indicates that it likely took from six to
nine months for Cuban intelligence to return to its earlier staffing
levels, reengage with its agents and restore agent confidence in their
security. As such, it wasn't until sometime in 2004 that Cuban
intelligence operations in the United States again threatened U.S.
national interests.

Chris Simmons is a career counterintelligence officer and an expert on
Cuban intelligence.

http://www.miamiherald.com/851/story/259686.html

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