2007-08-13. ICCAS
Jason Poblete* and Jaime Suchlicki**
August 13, 2007. Ever since Fidel Castro transferred leadership powers
to his brother General Raul Castro, there has been a great deal of
speculation in academia, the media, and the U.S. Government ("USG")
about what could happen politically in Cuba if one brother predeceases
the other. One school holds that a "transition" is already underway in
the island, while another holds that the political conditions, at least
at this juncture, show that it is a "succession" and not a transition.
It is a subtle, yet not unimportant distinction and goes to the heart of
a greater issue, continuity of U.S. policy toward the Western Hemisphere.
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
Since the late 1990s, U.S. law has clearly outlined a policy roadmap for
Cuban officials to use if they were genuinely seeking a change in
relations with, and recognition by the U.S. Some of these conditions
frequently find their way into speeches and statements of U.S. officials
including: the release of political prisoners, legalization of all
political activity, free and fair elections, and the respect of
fundamental freedoms. Yet one condition never mentioned, arguably the
most important from the U.S. standpoint, is that a transition government
cannot include either Fidel Castro or Raul Castro.
A former senior Bush Administration said a few years before the transfer
of power that the Cuban regime was "whistling past the graveyard" and
that a transition was already underway in Cuba. This sentiment has been
a recurrent theme during the past few years. Senior State Department
officials have been repeatedly quoted in recent media interviews, before
Congress, or at regional conferences advancing that a "transition is
underway" in Cuba. The notable one exception was Defense Intelligence
Agency ("DIA") Director Lt. Gen. Michael Maples who earlier this year
before a Congressional Committee correctly maintained that Raul Castro
will "likely maintain power and stability" after Castro's death and that
he has "widespread respect and support among Cuban military leaders who
will be crucial in a permanent government succession."
The "succession" distinction can serve a form of "political insurance"
for the Cuban people, including the future generation of political and
business leaders on the island. In other words, by reminding Cubans
that we will not replace one dictator for another as part of a
transition government, we reward short-term political risk taking by
prospective leaders and the general population. By calling it what it is
today in Cuba, a succession, we strengthen our policy of supporting
pro-democracy movements on the island by clearly signaling a constant
variable in this process and providing some certainty of our actions.
Nothing could be more powerful than the notion of "certainty" for people
struggling to change a government. Unlike other variables of U.S. law
that the current government could mimic in the public arena in speeches,
in the media or even diplomatic channels, the Cuban regime cannot tinker
or fake the requirement that a transition government cannot include
either of the Castro brothers.
Finally, at various levels of our government a constancy of rhetoric on
this point of succession has a useful and powerful application for U.S.
planners that manage the Western Hemisphere and Cuba. Our policy is
only as good as the ultimate outcome which, in this case, is a peaceful
reintegration and transition back to democracy in Cuba. A key component
of this process is accuracy and consistency that not only has
repercussions for Cuba policy planning, but for other pressing issues in
the Western Hemisphere that will undoubtedly be affected by leadership
changes on the island.
Cuba and U.S. Policy Toward Latin America
On this latter subject looms the larger issue involving U.S. policy
toward the Western Hemisphere, at least dating back to the Ford
Administration, of striving toward continuity of civilian-controlled
governments and regional security. The U.S. so ardently believes in
this model that, when absolutely necessary, we have even used our
military might to advance that agenda in places such as Haiti, Panama
and Grenada, or in more protracted engagements such as the war on drugs
in Colombia and the Andean region.
Since the Ford/Carter era, U.S. policy toward Latin America has
emphasized democracy, human rights and constitutional government. Under
President Ronald Reagan the U.S. intervened in Grenada, under President
Bush, Sr. the U.S. intervened in Panama and under President Clinton the
U.S. landed marines in Haiti, all to restore elected governments to
those countries. In addition, the U.S. has prevented military coups in
the region and supported the will of the people in free elections. While
U.S. policy emphasizing democracy, human rights and constitutional
government has not been uniformly applied throughout the world, it is
U.S. policy in the region. Lost in the U.S./Cuba policy debate is the
rather obvious point that Cuba is part of Latin America. Success or
failure in Cuba is success or failure of our Western Hemisphere policy.
A normalization of relations with a military dictatorship in Cuba with
General Raul Castro or any successor, will send the wrong message to the
rest of the Hemisphere: that militarism is welcomed again in the region
and that populist regimes that rig elections and perpetuate themselves
in power will also be welcomed. Supporting regimes and dictators that
violate human rights and abuse their population is an ill-advised policy
that rewards and encourages further abuses, whether in Cuba, Latin
America or any other region of the world.
Whatever little prestige the U.S. has left in Latin America and the
Caribbean is based on the fact that U.S. policy historically stands for
democracy, civilian-controlled governments. If we abandon this
principle in the region by allowing a military succession in Cuba, we
will loose whatever good will we have built since the Ford/Carter era.
This principle is enshrined in U.S./Cuba policies. Principles play an
important role in American foreign policy and we should not callously
abandon them in Cuba in the pursuit of mollifying a domestic
constituency for minor economic gains or in the hope, some would argue
quixotically, that trade, tourism and investments will soften a hardened
dictatorship and produce a regime change toward democracy.
Stay the Course on Cuba
In addition to concrete steps to advance U.S. policy articulated by U.S.
laws on the books since 1992, as well as the more recent White House
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, changing our rhetoric to
correctly convey this key pivot – that there can be no transition
government with either Fidel Castro or Raul Castro – is absolutely
vital. From this clear message, we must follow with no further
weakening of U.S. sanctions such as easing travel restrictions or
allowing increased sales of U.S. products to Cuba that only go to
support the fragile tourism trade in the island.
If anything, the easing of economic sanctions on Cuba without major
concessions from the Cuban government would send the wrong message "to
the enemies of the United States" in the Hemisphere and elsewhere: that
a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow
the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed
at the United Sates; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout
the world; and eventually the United States will "forget and forgive,"
and reward him with tourism, investments and economic aid. Moreover,
one could argue that Cuba has an even higher burden to meet in a post
September 11, 2001 world since it has clearly chosen to side with the
likes of Iran and other terror states, individuals, and groups.
As occurred in the mid-1990s, an infusion of American tourist dollars at
this juncture will provide the Cuban government with a further
disincentive to adopt deeper economic reforms. Cuba's limited economic
reforms were enacted in the early 1990s, when the island's economic
contraction was at its worst. Once the economy began to stabilize by
1996 as a result of foreign tourism and investments, and exile
remittances, the earlier reforms were halted or rescinded by the Cuban
Communist Party ("CCP"). Hence, the assumption that the Cuban leadership
would allow U.S. tourists or businesses to subvert the revolution and
influence internal developments is, at best, naïve.
An argument used by the supporters of easing travel restrictions to Cuba
is that through people-to-people contact, change can happen on the
island. Yet American tourists in Cuba will have limited contact with
Cubans. Most Cuban resorts are built in isolated areas, are off limits
to the average Cuban, and are controlled by Cuba's efficient security
apparatus. Most Americans don't speak Spanish, have but limited
contact with ordinary Cubans, and are not interested in visiting the
island to subvert its regime or spread democracy. In fact, the Cuban
Communist Party in addition to barring Cubans from public beaches to
limit exposure to foreigners, enacted Cuban Law 88 in 1999 to prohibit
Cubans from receiving publications from tourists.
There is no persuasive, much less credible evidence to support the
notion that engagement with a totalitarian state will bring about its
demise. Only academic ideologues and some members of Congress
interested in catering to the economic needs of their state's
constituencies cling to this notion. Their calls for ending the embargo
have little to do with democracy in Cuba or the welfare of the Cuban people.
In the end, if travel restrictions were eased by the Congress money from
American tourists would flow into businesses owned by the Castro
government thus strengthening state enterprises and, literally,
contravening U.S. law and undermining larger policy goals of a peaceful
transition to democracy. The tourist industry is controlled by the
military and the Castro brothers and it is the one area of the economy
on which the government, besides oil exploration, on which the future
economic survival of the island depends. Our goal in Cuba is not to
support the Cuban regime, and hurt the Cuban people. It is the other way
around. And, in a post-09/11/01 world, why would Americans want to
perpetuate a State Department-listed state sponsor of terror just 90
miles from our shores by spending money at its government-owned hotels
and beach front properties?
The travel ban and the embargo should be lifted as a result of
negotiations between the U.S. and a Cuban government willing to provide
meaningful political and economic concessions or when there is a
democratic government in place in the island. U.S. law provides the
Cuban government and its sole political party, the Cuban Communist
Party, a clear roadmap on what it needs to do to change the status of
relations between our two countries.
The U.S. should start by reminding the Cubans that one key,
non-negotiable point, at least according to U.S. law since the 1990s, is
that a transition government cannot include either of the Castro
brothers. Unless Congress amends the law, our policy should be clear
and unequivocal. It will ensure that we view U.S. policy toward Cuba as
we do toward the rest of the Western Hemisphere as well as inject a much
needed post-09/11 dose of reality in dealing with a state sponsor of
terrorism.
*******
*Jason Poblete is a Washington, DC Attorney at the international law
firm Reed Smith and practices in the Federal Government Contracts/Export
Controls & Trade Group. He is the editor of the Washington report, part
of the Cuba Business Roundtable newsletter, a publication of the
Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies.
**Jaime Suchlicki is professor and Director of ICCAS at the University
of Miami. He is the author of Cuba from Columbus to Castro, now in its
fifth edition.
http://www.miscelaneasdecuba.net/web/article.asp?artID=11158
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