Fidel ordered Chavez Rescue

Fidel ordered Chávez's 'Rescue'
"They attempted to execute Chávez but the firing squad refused to shoot"
by Fidel Castro and Ignacio Ramonet; April 22, 2006

In the book "Fidel Castro, a two-voiced biography," published by
the Debate Publishing House, the Cuban president told Ignacio Ramonet
information not previously released about the events of April 2002 in
Venezuela.

Castro states that he phoned Miraflores Palace before Chávez
surrendered and told him: "Don't kill yourself, Hugo. Don't do like
Allende, who was a man alone. You have most of the Army on your side.
Don't quit, don't resign."

Later, Fidel directed Cuban Foreign Minister Felipe Pérez Roque, to
fly to Caracas in one of two planes to pick up Chávez and fly him to safety.

Castro contacted "a general who sided with [Chávez]" to tell him
that the world knew the president had not resigned and to ask the
general to send troops to rescue the president.

Fidel Castro, who delivers so many speeches, has granted very few
interviews. Only four long conversations with him have been published in
the past 50 years. The fifth such interview, with the editor of Le Monde
Diplomatique, Ignacio Ramonet, has become the book "Fidel Castro, a
two-voiced biography," a summary of the life and thoughts of the Cuban
chief of state, distilled from 100 hours of conversation. The first
interview was held in late January 2003; the final one, in December 2005.

Published in these pages is an excerpt from the interview in which
Castro talks about the Venezuelan conflict that occurred on April 11,
2002. As the Comandante says, he will remain in office "as long as the
National Assembly, in the name of the Cuba people, wishes." The book,
soon to appear, is published by the Debate Publishing House.

Progreso Weekly is pleased to translate and reproduce excerpts from
the interview, published in Koeyú Latinoamericano.

Ignacio Ramonet (IR): You have said you feel a great admiration for
Hugo Chávez, President of Venezuela.

Fidel Castro (FC): Well, yes. There we have another Indian, Hugo
Chávez, a new Indian who is, as he himself says, "an Indian mixture,"
mestizo, with a little white, he says. But you look at Chávez and you
see an autochthonous son of Venezuela, the son of a Venezuela that
itself is a mixture. But he has all those noble features and an
exceptional, truly exceptional talent.

I make it a point to listen to his speeches. He feels proud of his
humble origin, of his mixed ethnic background, which has a little of
everything, mainly of those who were autochthonous people or slaves
brought from Africa, with a mixture of Indian origin. That's the
impression. Maybe he has some white genes, and that's not bad. The
combination always is good, it enriches humanity, the combination of the
so-called ethnic backgrounds.

IR: Have you followed closely the evolution of the situation in
Venezuela, particularly the attempts to destabilize President Chávez?

FC: Yes, we have followed events with great attention. Chávez
visited us after being released from prison before the 1998 elections.
He was very brave, because he was much reproached for traveling to Cuba.
He came here and we talked. We discovered an educated, intelligent man,
very progressive, an authentic Bolivarian. Later he won the elections
several times. He changed the Constitution. He had the formidable
support of the people, of the humblest people. His adversaries have
tried to asphyxiate him economically.

In the 40 famous years of "democracy" that preceded Chávez, I
estimate that about $200 billion fled from the country. Venezuela could
be more industrialized than Sweden and enjoy Sweden's levels of
education, if in truth there had been a distributive democracy, if those
mechanisms had worked, if there had been some truth and credibility in
all that demagoguery and all that publicity.

From the time that Chávez took office until currency controls were
established in January 2003, I estimate that about $30 billion flew out
of the country -- capital flight. So, as we maintain, all those
phenomena make the order of things unsustainable in our hemisphere.

IR: On April 11, 2002, there was a coup d'état against Chávez in
Caracas.
Did you follow those events.

FC: When we learned that the demonstration by the opposition had
changed direction and was nearing Miraflores [Palace], that there were
provocations, shootings, victims, and that some high officials had
mutinied and come out publicly against the president, that the
presidential guard had withdrawn and that the army was on its way to
arrest him, I phoned Chávez because I knew that he was defenseless and
that he was a man of principle, and said to
him: "Don't kill yourself, Hugo! Don't do like Allende! Allende was
a man alone, he didn't have a single soldier on his side. You have a
large part of the army. Don't quit! Don't resign!"

IR: You were encouraging him to resist, gun in hand?

FC: No, on the contrary. That's what Allende did, and he paid
heroically with his life. Chávez had three alternatives: To hunker down
in Miraflores and resist to death; to call on the people to rebel and
unleash a civil war; or to surrender without resigning, without
quitting. We recommended the third choice, which was what he also had
decided to do. Because history teaches us that every popular leader
overthrown in those circumstances, if he's not killed the people claim
him, and sooner or later he returns to power.

IR: At that moment, did you try to help Chávez somehow?

FC: Well, we could act only by using the resources of diplomacy. In
the middle of the night we summoned all the ambassadors accredited to
Havana and we proposed to them that they accompany Felipe [Pérez Roque],
our Foreign Minister, to Caracas to rescue Chávez, the legitimate
president of Venezuela. We proposed sending two planes to bring him
here, in case the putschists decided to send him into exile.

Chávez had been imprisoned by the military putschists and his
whereabouts were unknown. The television repeatedly reported the news of
his "resignation" to demobilize his supporters, the people. But at one
point, they allow Chávez to make a phone call and he manages to talk to
his daughter, María Gabriela. And he tells her that he has not quit,
that he has not resigned. That he is "a president under arrest." And he
asks her to spread that news.

The daughter then has the bold idea to phone me and she informs me.
She confirms to me that her father has not resigned. We then decided to
assume the defense of the Venezuelan democracy, since we had proof that
countries like the United States and Spain -- the government of José
María Aznar -- who talk so much about democracy and criticize Cuba so
much, were backing the coup d'état.

We asked María Gabriela to repeat it and recorded the conversation
she had with Randy Alonso, the moderator of the Cuban TV program "Mesa
Redonda"
[Round Table], which had great international repercussion. In
addition, we summoned the entire foreign news media accredited to Cuba
-- by then it must have been 4 o'clock in the morning -- we informed
them and played them the testimony of Chávez's daughter. CNN broadcast
it at once and the news spread like a flash of gunpowder throughout
Venezuela.

IR: And what was the consequence of that?

FC: Well, that was heard by the military people faithful to Chávez,
who had been deceived by the lie about a resignation, and then there is
a contact with a general who is on Chávez's side. I talk to him on the
phone. I confirm to him personally that what the daughter said is true
and that the entire world knows Chávez has not resigned.

I talk with him a long time. He informs me about the military
situation, about which high-ranking officers are siding with Chávez and
which are not.
I understand that nothing is lost, because the best units of the
Armed Forces, the most combative, the best trained, were in favor of
Chávez. I tell that officer that the most urgent task is to find out
where Chávez is being detained and to send loyal forces there to rescue him.

He then asks me to talk to his superior officer and turns me over
to him. I repeat what Chávez's daughter has said, and stress that he
continues to be the constitutional president. I remind him of the
necessary loyalty, I talk to him about Bolívar and the history of
Venezuela. And that high-ranking officer, in a gesture of patriotism and
fidelity to the Constitution, asserts to me that, if it's true that
Chávez has not resigned, he continues to be faithful to the president
under arrest.

IR: But even at that moment nobody knows where Chávez is, true?

FC: Meanwhile, Chávez has been taken to the island of La Orchila.
He is incommunicado. The Archbishop of Caracas goes to see him and
counsels him to resign. "To avoid a civil war," he says. He commits
humanitarian blackmail. He asks [Chávez] to write a letter saying he is
resigning.

Chávez doesn't know what's happening in Caracas or the rest of the
country. They've already tried to execute him, but the men in the firing
squad have refused and threatened to mutiny. Many of the soldiers who
guard Chávez are ready to defend him and to prevent his assassination.
Chávez tries to gain time with the bishop. He writes drafts of a
statement. He fears that once he finishes the letter, [his captors] will
arrange to eliminate him. He has no intention of resigning. He declares
that they'll have to kill him first. And that there will be no
constitutional solution then.

IR: Meanwhile, was it still your intention to send planes to rescue
him and take him into exile?

FC: No, after that conversation with the Venezuelan generals, we
changed plans. We shelved Felipe's proposition to travel with the
ambassadors to Caracas. What's more, shortly thereafter we hear a rumor
that the putschists are proposing to expel Chávez to Cuba. And we
immediately announce that if they send Chávez here, we shall send him
back to Venezuela on the first available plane.

IR: How does Chávez return to power?

FC: Well, at one point we again get in contact with the first
general with whom I had spoken and he informs me that they've located
Chávez, that he's on the island of La Orchila. We talk about the best
way to rescue him. With great respect, I recommend three basic steps:
discretion, efficacy and overwhelming force. The parachutists from the
base at Maracay, the best unit of the Venezuelan Armed Forces, who are
faithful to Chávez, carry out the rescue.

Meanwhile, in Caracas, the people have mobilized, asking for
Chávez's return. The presidential guard has reoccupied Miraflores
[Palace] and also demands the president's return. It expels the
putschists from the palace. Pedro Carmona, president of the management
association and very temporary President-usurper of Venezuela, is almost
arrested right there at the palace.

Finally, at dawn on April 14, 2002, rescued by the faithful
soldiers, Chávez arrives in Miraflores amid a popular apotheosis. I
almost did not sleep the two days of the Caracas coup, but it was
worthwhile for me to see how a people, and also patriotic soldiers,
defended the law. The tragedy of Chile in 1973 was not repeated.

IR: Chávez is a representative of the progressive armed forces, but
in Europe and Latin America many progressives reproach him precisely
because he is a military man. What opinion do you have about that
apparent contradiction between progressiveness and the military?

FC: Look, in Venezuela we have an army playing an important role in
the Bolivarian revolution. And Omar Torrijos, in Panama, was an example
of a soldier with conscience. Juan Velasco Alvarado, in Peru, also
carried out some notable acts of progress. Let's not forget, for
example, that among the Brazilians, Luis Carlos Prestes was an officer
who led a march in 1924-26 almost like the march led by Mao Zedong in
1934-35.

Jorge Amado wrote about the march of Luis Carlos Prestes in a
beautiful story, "The Gentleman of Hope," one of his magnificent novels.
I had an opportunity to read them all, and that march was something
impressive. It lasted more than two and a half years, covering enormous
territories in his country, and he never suffered defeat.

In other words, there were prowesses that came from the military.
Let's say, I'm going to cite a Mexican military man, Lázaro Cárdenas, a
general of the Mexican Revolution, who nationalized petroleum. He is
very prominent, carries out agrarian reform and gains the support of the
people. When one talks about affairs in Mexico, one mustn't forget the
roles played by personalities like Lázaro Cárdenas. And Lázaro Cárdenas
originated in the military.

One mustn't forget that the first people in Latin America to rise
up in the 20th Century, in the 1950s, were a group of youths who
rebelled, young Guatemalan officers, who gathered around Jacobo Arbenz
and participated in revolutionary activities. Well, you can't say that's
a general phenomenon but there are several cases of progressive military
men.

In Argentina, Perón also came from military origins. You need to
see the moment when he emerges. In 1943, he was appointed Minister of
Labor and drafted such good laws that when he was taken to prison the
people rescued him -- and he was a military chief. There was also a
civilian who had influence over the military men, he studied in Italy,
where Perón also had lived; he was Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, and they were
popular leaders.

Perón was an embassy attaché. He worked in Rome in the 1930s during
the Mussolini period and was impressed by some of the forms and methods
of mass mobilization he witnessed. There was influence, including in
some processes, but in those cases where I mention that influence,
Gaitán and Perón used it in a positive sense, because the truth is that
Perón carried out social reform.

Perón commits, let us say, a mistake. He offends the Argentine
oligarchy, humiliates it, strips it of its symbolic theater and some
symbolic institutions. He worked with the nation's reserves and
resources and improved the living conditions of the workers. And the
workers were very grateful, and Perón became an idol of the workers.

http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=60&ItemID=10136