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Friday, August 14, 2015

Redefining the Cuban Opposition After 17 December

Redefining the Cuban Opposition After 17 December / Cubanet, Alexis
Jardines Chacon
Posted on August 12, 2015

Cubanet, Alexis Jardines Chacon, Miami, 7 August 2015 – The First
National Cuban Conference will be held August 13-15 in San Juan, Puerto
Rico. It is an event that Cubans United of Puerto Rico have been
preparing for a year, inviting organizations from both shores. The
meeting hopes to focus on the unity of diversity. What follows explores
the nature of the differences and the bases on which unity might rest.

The danger of reformism

When Raul Castro took over the nation after the desmerengamiento* of his
brother Fidel in 2008, the opposition, to some extent, had to reinvent
itself. A series of measures – outstanding among them being the new law
regarding travel and emigration – temporarily left the dissidents
without an anchor, because they could now leave the country and return
without consequences. But the explosive side of the new law was
something else: the dissidents soon were more engaged abroad than toward
the interior of Cuba. And, naturally, we didn't have to wait for a media
reaction against this kind of tourist-dissent.

The absence of a structured political opposition leaves civil society
activism very vulnerable to the impact of Raul's reforms. When
opposition activity is reduced to a package of demands to the current
government, any change undertaken by the regime could exceed the
expectations of the dissidence itself. The dissidence, for example, was
not prepared to assume to the challenges of the lifting of the travel
restrictions, while the effect for the government was a revitalization
of its impoverished symbolic capital.

It is a fact that ordinary Cubans are more radical in their anti-Castro
convictions than a good part of the so-called opposition. And it is at
least curious that from the side of the opposition they are asking for
reforms in a system that bases its politics in the reforms of its model
(of socialism). The paradox is solved when we realize that the logic of
reformism is compatible with the dissidence, but not with the political
opposition.

The other crushing blow came from the hand of President Obama. A good
part of the dissidence and activists were left outside the umbrella of
the American government, now interested in those who unconditionally
support the process of normalization.

A major campaign is being conducted – inside and outside of Cuba – to
sell the bi-tonal (black/white) scheme of what is taking place. It would
seem there are no nuances; whomever does not support the Obama pact,
Castro places automatically on the side of the extremism and violence
associated with the construct of the
extreme-right-reactionary-bloodthirsty-living-in-the-past.

This biased and misleading way of labeling does not recognize the
current that defends normalization, but with conditions. Rather, it puts
in the same sack a broad spectrum of those it considers hostile to both
governments, from the activists of Estado de Sats to those of the Miami
exile group Vigilia Mambisa.

The hardcore, instead, pass themselves off as open people with a string
of virtues: inclusion, spirit of dialog, pacifism and a long et cetera.
In short, they see themselves as what sells, what is in fashion and in
tune with the current times. This posture, which bears fruit inside and
outside of the country, shows no interest in ordinary Cubans.

Their concern is focused on the environment of relations between the
Cuban and the United States governments, so they are only interested
defending – moderated through the interior of Cuba and extreme pressure
groups, such as Cuban Americans for Engagement (CAFE) – dialog with the
Cuban regime, masked under the innocuous idea of non-confrontation. And
it is clear that when there is talk of conditions, from the other side
of the opposition spectrum, it is about dialog and rapprochement in
general between the governments of Cuba and the United States and not
about the classic and sterile demands of the Cuban government before 17
December, which do not transcend the logic of reformism and would have
to abandon taking concrete steps in the physical space, for the same
reason that they haven't worked in all the years of the dictatorship.

My question, then – in accord with the premise offered by President
Obama – is: if what doesn't work is changed, why don't the hardcore
supporters of normalization take to the streets to support, at least,
the marches of the Ladies in White? If the majority of the Cuban people
are anti-Castro and the weak side of the opposition knows that it has
been incommunicado vis-à-vis ordinary Cubans, why not go discretely
house-to-house to prepare people for a referendum? These are true
opposition actions that do not require funds or immolations.

What is the danger, in short, of reformism? That comes from delimiting a
front in which the frontiers between the ruling party, the dissidence
and the trusted opposition are increasingly erased? In this scenario,
the real opposition turns out to be an obstacle.

The light at the end of the tunnel

It is obvious that rulers who adopt the totalitarian model do so with
the express purpose of staying in power indefinitely. If this happens in
a country like Cuba the chances of regime change, even in the long term
are minimal. There is a cultural issue, in this case, which takes its
toll. Personally, I am convinced that if Einstein was resurrected and
was standing on a corner in Havana, inside of five minutes he would have
in front of him a couple of individuals explaining the theory of
relativity. These types – in the unlikely event they would allow the
genius to discuss the matter – would end up reproaching him with the
argument that "you don't know shit about physics."

Then comes the issue of the bodeguita, as a friend of mine defines it:
in the face of any suggestion of collaboration, if it's a question of
survival it's every man for himself. One can imagine how difficult it is
to unite the dissidence, activists and opposition around an objective
that transcends the expectations of a guild. But, even if we make an
abstraction of the anthropological-cultural theme, the principal
obstacle would stand: are you interested in the validation of a
democratic regime, or in democratizing the current regime? Whatever your
option you will achieve nothing without dismantling the one-party
system. Therefore, consensus – if it were possible – should not be built
on the basis of reformist objectives.

In any event, since 17 December things are becoming ever more clear and
it will have to be defined on what bases a lobbying in favor of
unconditional dialog with the dictatorship and a resistance interaction
with ordinary Cubans enter into the extension of the concept of
opposition. In the year 2011 – having recently gone into exile – I came
to the defense of Estado de Sats before some accusations of Marta
Beatriz Roque branding the projects as dissidence-light, and pondered
the logic of the traditional opposition, rooted in ideas of heroism and
the barricade. The beatings they gave us was the weighty argument that
the venerable opposition wielded against us.

Since then, each in his own way, we have been radicalized. I, who
thought more as a dissident, now do so from the angle of the opposition.
And I don't know about the ironies of destiny, only that the issue of
Cuba is a GPS constantly being relocated: today Antonio Rodiles, leader
of Estado de Sats, is the one who receives the beatings and not a few of
the old guard opposition look away when the Ladies in White begin their
march every Sunday.

Personally, I believe that the conditions are given. Access to public
spaces, to the street, is there in front of everyone. It is not a
chimera, it is not impossible. If you are an opponent marching with
these untamed women you protect the space that they were able to conquer
for all of us. Sacred space, because it is the only thing we really have
and the only thing that puts the dictatorship in check. If you are an
opponent looking to connect with the people, you go house to house – as
the Jehovah Witnesses have done in much more difficult times – with the
purpose of making every Cuban see the need to put an end to the
one-party system through a popular referendum. If you are an opponent
you work to give a voice to the people, the ordinary Cuban.

The combination of these three factors could be the unity of purpose
sought by the opposition in the diversity of its ways, namely: support,
through one's physical presence, of the Sunday marches, the individual
and systematic contact – face-to-face – with the people in the
neighborhoods, the blocks and the homes to get them to vote NO to the
hegemony of the Cuban Communist Party in the popular vote of 2016; the
consequent need for the people to decide how and by whom they should be
governed through a plebiscite. This line and its media support is what,
in my opinion, defines the opposition camp in Cuba after the moves of 17
December. The rest is also necessary, but not necessarily opposition.
Ergo, if this embassy that will soon open in Havana limits its contacts
to the reformist scene, then we will know – at least with regards to the
issue of Cuba – who is the boss in Washington.

Source: Redefining the Cuban Opposition After 17 December / Cubanet,
Alexis Jardines Chacon | Translating Cuba -
http://translatingcuba.com/redefining-the-cuban-opposition-after-17-december-cubanet-alexis-jardines-chacon/

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